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AFRICA AND THE 1980's: Issues, Problems and Prospects
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3y Reginald Herbold Green
The prospect of impending disaster is not 
just a figment of the imagination. The facts 
are there to be seen, pointing to the past and 
to the present with an accusing finger and to the 
future with scornful laughter.'
- OAU/ECA Symccsium,
’Africa Towards The Year 20C0" , 1979.
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has 
to live in even worse conditions while he is 
rebuilding it and making a decent house for 
himself. In the same way we have to accept the 
existence of problems which are created by the 
very fact of trying to convert the colonialist 
and semi-capitalist economy we inherited into a 
nationalist and socialist economy.
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, 1977 »
We must lock at cur mistakes lest we fall.into 
repeating them.
Rui Baltazar Santos, Southern 
African Development Coordination 
Conference, 1979.
I.
To explore all of the issues, problems and prospects of 
every African state for the next decade would require an 
encyclopedia to print and an encyclopedic team of authors 
to write. The aim of this essay is rather more modest.
Tss”es cr 1*ot"! cs of cvsr'*1' ditc concern a^e usually csrinsd 
in terms of problems. Problems in 'the sense that there is 
no reason to expect a benign invisible hand or an existing
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smoothly functioning piece of state or corporate apparatus 
to solve them. Problems also in the sense that something 
can be done to resolve or transcend them- Prospects are 
a judgement - or' in the more sophisticated scenario 
erecting branches of futurology alternative judgements - 
about how and with what future results the problems will 
be tackled.
Africa is not homogenous. Different constellations of 
issues, of priorities among problems, of plausible 
prospects apply to different states or even different 
regions and communities within any one state. However 
some issues relating to deep seated prcb lems which show 
no signs of early resolution are common to most African 
states and to Africa as a region. Whether the struggle 
which these problems or contradictions g-ive rise will 
result in transcending syntheses or blockage is a major 
element in prospects from the continental to the village 
level. Unless they are at least in part: overcome, then 
with the OECD "Interfutures" Group" one is:
Forced to envisage as a continuation of the 
present situation of virtual economic stagnation, 
particularly with regard to agriculture, with 
esculating local conflicts and external interference.
Six issues which appear to meet these tests of overriding
importance and continental scope will be reviewed. Perhaps,2others should be added but it is hard to deny the following 
items places on any short list:
1. Food supply
2. Income distribution and access
2. Participation
4. Legitimacy of states
5. Southern African liberation
6. African development coordination.
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II
Food Supply: .
Most Africans do not have enough to eat. Most African states
3import substantial1 amounts of staple foodstuffs. On the 
first count the situation is at best improving very slowly 
in most states and worsening in some. On the second deterioration 
not progress, is the general pattern.
Production failure has b e e n ‘attributed to many causes. The 
Sahel and Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanzania, the Mahgreb and 
Zambia have been affected by severe droughts. Funds for 
seed or fertilizer or extension services have often been 
lacking. Land needed for staple foods has been under 
export crops e.g. in the Senegal groundnut country.
But, valid as they are as parts of the explanation;these 
cannot be the whole.. Nigeria's per capita - perhaps even 
absolute - food production has been on a downward trend 
for fifteen years. Kenya's per capita domestic food production 
has been drifting downward for over a decade. In the Fleuve 
and Casamance Senegal has plenty of land to raise food 
production dramatically. Nor are the cases of regular 
growth of food production well above population growth - 
e.g. Malawi, Tanzania - marked by uniform absence of drought 
or presence of very effective extension services or supplies 
of inputs.
Availability too gives rise to certain causal answers.
Money for commercial imports or state financed drought 
relief was lacking e.g. in Senegal in the early and mid 
1970's. Physical and organizational ability to distribute 
food to the worst hit rural areas has not existed e.g.
Ethiopia both before and after the revolution (even if for 
rather different reasons)-
Again, true enough, but two "success'’ stories - Somalia 
and Tanzania - were marked neither by high levels of 
foreign exchange nor high rural incomes nor strong general 
transport systems nor general ability to organize and 
operate all state activities quickly and efficiently.
The difference appears to have been in the priority 
given averting starvation which resulted in prompt 
response, concentration of organizing capacity, allocation 
of resources (all of Tanzania’s opening 1974 foreign 
exchange reserves) and rapid distribution which got the 
food out whatever else could be said about its efficiency.
If the 1980's are a rerun of the 1970's then for most of
4Africa SWAPO' s comment will be the best possible result:
A nation which is dependent on other countries 
for the food consumption of its population 
cannot but be a dependent hostage of the 
particular country which feeds its. population.
Best, because for many Africans the result will in fact be 
death from the diseases of extreme malnutrition or literal 
starvation even if they are virtually within sight of 
ports where food could be landed - as in the Bas Congo 
today.
The bottom line of the challenge'of production reads: 
productivity, rural/urban terms of trade, income 
distribution. That of availability reads: income
distribution, decision taker priority to basic human 
needs.
For production adequate prices - to the grower, not just 
by the consumer - and a chance to earn a decent income 
and to receive basic services (education, health, water, 
enough law and order to be able to go about his concerns 
in safety) are vital. Better marketing and distribution 
(including something to'be bought by the rural crop selle 
are critical. Often knowledge and inputs must be made 
available (and first discovered) for really large, 
sustained productivity gains. All of this is in the 
end rather boring - except during a food crisis - and 
requires sustained hard work - not just during a food 
crisis.
/
As the very different cases of Malawi and Tanzania 
demonstrate it is not impossible. How common will it 
be in the 1980's?
Partly this depends on participation and legitimacy. If 
peasants win a say in states/they do demand attention to 
agriculture and rural services/ if a state in Africa is 
seriously seeking legitimacy it can hardly be totally 
unconcenred with rural welfare or food availability.
The uses of adversity may also help. Shortages of 
foreign exchange - even in major oil exporters like 
Algeria and Nigeria - do concentrate the political and 
official mind on agricultural production and, less 
certainly, on those who do the producing. There will be 
more and more prolonged foreign exchange crises in the 
1980's.
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III
Income Distribution and Access
While the formal data are at best fragmentary5 , both they 
and observation reveal very wide disparities of income in 
almost all African states. More critical for prospects, 
in a majority of cases these are widening. In terms of 
the ratios between the top 1 or 2% of salary earners, 
minimum wage earners and peasants,Africa has probably 
already "achieved” the greatest disparities of any 
continent.
This is not a set of phenomena characterizing only the 
successful capitalist road states such as Kenya and the 
Ivory Coast, the newly oil rich without coherent strategies 
to raise the incomes of the masses,e.g. Gabon, Nigeria, 
or the states en voie de desintegration,e.g. Zaire. It 
is also true of those deeply concerned with peasant welfare, 
e.g. Botswana, and those seeking to build non-capitalist 
mixed economies,e.g. Zambia, and those engaged in serious 
efforts to achieve transitions to socialism,e.g. A.lgeria.
Accompanying and interlocking with the growing inequality 
are two failures: failure to make significant progress in
raising the average incomes and purchasing power of the 
poor majorities of peasants and "informal” (residual?) 
sector non agricultural workers. Failure even to develop 
a really broad and growing middle class of peasant 
proprietors, small businessmen, professionals and 
officials with a real stake in the system. Neither the 
Maoist principle of "all beats float higher” broad front 
advance nor the "equality of access to the elite” principle 
of the creative variant of capitalism can credibly be
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asserted to operate in more than a handful of states.
The result is the grim realities of Petals of Slocd6 , 
and of the stark, wasteland, dump for people that is 
Pekine - Senegal's second largest city.
There is nothing inevitable about this. Tanzania has
reduced income inecuality and has made systematic advances
7toward basic human needs fulfilment even in a context or 
very low levels of attained productive forces and 
relatively modest (even if well above the African average) 
rates of growth. The same can be said of Mozambique and 
Somalia. While Algeria has had growing inequality - and 
a very open dialogue about the threat it poses - it has 
also made progress toward meeting the basic service access needs 
of the majority of its peoples,albeit not their 
.capacity to produce and to earn the greatest progress 
toward creating a broad middle (petty bourgois) class 
even though this is in fact an undesired by product of
national solidarity and key sector surplus generation
promotion.
The conditions for reversing these trends are stringent.
Ceilings are needed as well as floors - given the
resources available in Africa real luxury for some
necessarily means real deprivation for many. Rural 
strategies designed to promote production and raise 
incomes, not extract surplus and control peasants, 
are equally essential. (And vital if the food "problem" 
is to be surmounted.) So is breaking those coalitions 
of elites which amount to transnational alliances (TNCs 
and local political/bureaucratic/managerial partners) 
against the workers and peasants.
Provision of services - health, education, water, housing 
is in principle easier. But in fact it will not be dene 
without, the' more basic changes just cited. Priority 
allocations of funds and personnel will not happen - it 
is Tanzania not Kenya which has achieved at least 60% 
adult literacy and millions of adult continuing education 
students.
Two forces may lead to change in the 1980's. First the 
dictum of Anton Rupert, the Afrikaaner magnate "If they 
do not eat, we shall not sleep" may become an item in 
the political economic strategy of the less poor, 
capitalist road states e.g. Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Cameroon, Nigeria. Second, the uses of adversity may 
enforce such strategies on states with poor growth 
prospects or results - e.g. Zambia, Upper Volta, Mali, 
Mauritius - as a condition for the survival of 
legitimate, functioning politics.
IV
Participation
gThe OAU/ECA symposium grimly warned:
the issues of freedom and justice can no longer 
be left in abeyance. Only yesterday, the birth 
of a State that respected basic freedoms was one 
of the most important demands in the struggle 
for independence. Has this erstwhile dream now 
turned into a nightmare in which repression and 
censorship condemn whole generations of Africans 
to silence?
9and again:"
The problem of under-employment and unemployment 
is more and more serious ... to place employment, 
in other words the social usefulness of men and 
women, at the centre ...
The no party state, increased repression, growing slums 
and bidonvilles, peasant retreat from the State and the 
market - these are the common coin of African political 
discussion. Without participation in two senses they 
will continue to be: First participation in production
at high enough levels of output and fair enough levels 
of remuneration (whether wages or agricultural prices) 
to be both economically self reliant and economically 
important to the state. Second direct participation in 
decisions directly affecting peasants and workers in 
their villages and neighborhoods, their workplaces 
and primary markets and indirect participation through 
leaders chosen by and responsible to them in national 
policy making.
Without such participation access to food and to services 
and to income distribution cannot be tackled. There 
will be no effective discipline on leaders - or on 
TNCb - no real priority to decent rural incomes, or 
universal access to basic services.
This is not an area in which great success stories can 
be cited - in Africa or anywhere else. The problems of 
elitism, bureaucratism, isolation of leaders, arrogance 
of officials, greed of the rich are deep rooted - as 
is only too evident in the states in which they have 
been struggled against, held at bay, perhaps turned back 
in part, e.g. Somalia, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Tanzania/ 
and in those in which the struggle has been made and 
has the backing of sincere and dedicated leaders but 
may well be being lost/e.g. Zambia, Botswana, Algeria.
The question for the 1980's is whether necessity will 
inforce the freedom to participate beyond a handful 
of states. Perhaps. The end of military rule may force 
the attention of the returning political figures to be 
less exclusive than before/e.g. in Nigeria and Ghana.
The fact that bourgois democracy cannot live without a 
broader participatory base (on production and on decision 
taking) than now exists may be seen in a few states e.g.
Kenya, Tunisia, Senegal. The liberation movements in 
power may be able to hold to their genuine commitment 
to and practice of participation - Mozambique and Guinea- 
Bissau point that way as - despite adversity - does 
Angola,but the same cannot be said of Ethiopia. States 
seeking to reduce dependence - or foreign exchange crisis - 
through food and basic services strategies may see that 
production and decision participation are instrumental 
as well as moral necessities,e.g. Algeria's return toward 
auto gestion, decentralization and rural development 
triggered by 1972-74 explosions in the volume and cost 
of agricultural imports.
V
Legitimacy of States
There are not two types of polities, economies, societies 
in Africa - en voie de developpement and en voie de 
develcppement dependant (ou de developpement de sous 
develcppement). There is a third - en voie de desintegration. 
These are states whose basic legitimacy is either in 
question or is no longer in question because it is a 
fading memory from one past.
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This category is not limited to the vicious 
dictatorial systems that have earned fairly 
approbrium: Nguema and Amin that were, Bcka
It extends to the cases in which there is nc 
state - oppressive or otherwise - e.g. Chad, 
includes cases in which a capital and a tiny 
propped up by a revenue earning enclave and 
de jure or de facto external proprietors anc 
while the national economy, society . and poli 
deliquescence - e.g. Zaire.
Wor.se there are dangers that mere polities' w 
en voie de desintegration. The reasons may 
copper prices and the Rhodesian rebels have 
Zambia to the brink; the heritage of Mr. Se 
Kissinger’s attempts to make Angola "Sideshc 
to follow Kampuchea and the continued South 
intervention create the same dangers for Anc 
may be internal - in 1965 the Nigerian elite 
thoroughly made the misuse of public office 
gain the governing ideology that the Sardaur 
had lost legitimacy. Mauretania abandoned : 
to the southern zone of the Sahara Democrat: 
because it stood on the brink of losing leg: 
home; the present Moroccan state’s legitime 
intertwined with its annexation of the Saha: 
Republic that it is hard to see how it can c 
itself from a war of colonization it can ne. 
carry on indefinitely without grave peril t- 
to sustain the burden of legitimacy at home 
of participation and the degree of material 
the Ethiopian revolution in its central zcn- 
in peril by the fact that it has net been a. 
legitimacy in the eyes cf the peepla cf the 
the Awash, Eritrea, and until it dees is fc 
under siege and with a siege mentality.
Legitimacy does not require full participation nor socialism 
nor even full bourgois democracy. Kenya and the Ivory 
Coast, Senegal, Swaziland, Tunisia and Togo are legitimate. 
The test is a state which has, acts on and produces some 
results from its policies and which is responsive and 
responsible to substantial domestic class coalitions not 
to a handful of power holders, entrepreneurs of adversity 
and foreign backers or creditors. Cne element is ability 
for ordinary people to go about their occupations and 
daily lives in some security (from state officials and 
bandits alike). Law and order is not everything, its 
total absence usually guarantees there will be nothing 
else.
This slide of a significant number of states to the edge - 
or beyond the edge - of illegitimacy as perceived by 
their people is chilling. If it is not reversed the 
"scornful laughter" warned against by the OAU/ECA 
symposium will triumph and only the vultures (winged 
and otherwise, domestic and foreign) will have cause to 
exult. It is very hard to claw back - the post Amin 
course of Uganda is arduous and perilous, the desparate 
efforts to preserve (or recreate) the Chad sometimes 
lock like trying to water its deserts with a tea spoon.
Two strands can be picked out. The first is solidarity 
with those in danger - helping Zambia break the Khodesian 
stranglehold and the copper price assault/ exploring 
ways in which Morocco can extricate itself from the 
Sahara and revolutionary Ethiopia overcome the heritage 
of hatred it has been bequeathed in what were the 
Imperial Outlands. The second, is more effective
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waging of the liberation struggle against South Africa 
and its outriders - only that can avert a series of 
mortal challenges to Mozambique and Angola, Swaziland 
and Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia.
VI
Southern African Liberation
The course of the Southern African liberation struggle 
is critical for Africa in the 1980's (and perhaps 
for the nature of great power relations in the 1980’s 
too). That view is shared by the trilateralist 
intelligentsia^, by the Front Line States, by the 
Liberation Movements.
This is evident enough for Namibians, Zimbabweans,
South Africans. It is also clear enough for the Front 
Line States who face armed raids, security costs, 
economic dislocations which can run as high as 25% of 
fixed investment and 5% of national output for "backup 
zone" ones like Tanzania and much more for those with 
recurrent forays and regular destabilization on their 
soil like Angola. For Africa as a whole it may seem 
less clear - not every state speaks or acts with 
the force of Algeria and Nigeria.
It is critical to African self respect - The continued 
existence of compulsory, legislated racism at the core 
of the ideology of states in Africa diminishes all 
Africans; its ending would demonstrate that African 
states could act and achieve in a causa beycnd persona 
or national material gain.
Liberation is equally critical for external respect. It 
is a brutal fact that the "accusing finger" the OAU/ECA 
Symposium sees is seen by many who were the friends of 
Africa and Africans. It has c o d e d  their desire to stand 
in solidarity, placed weapons in the hands of Africa's 
enemies, turned perceptions and phrases of hope into 
hollow mockeries. Just as Amin's perverted use of 
the slogans of self reliance and struggle demeaned and 
degraded the image of all Africa,so the first steps 
toward the liberation of Uganda and Ugandans by Africans 
has helped restore dignity and perceptions. Southern 
Africa is a similar struggle.
Finally many African states and Africans deeply .need
major successes to restore their own hope and faith
and will to work for victories at home as well as externally.
1974-1979 have been grim years for most, the dogged
battle against calamity is less daunting to maintain when
there are clear battles won.
Battles - not the campaign. Zimbabwe and Namibia must 
be genuinely independent long before 1990 or the cost to 
Africa dees not bear estimation. But South Africa will 
not be Azania by then - the process may have taken fitful 
first steps but the last laager will not have been 
broken.
What is to be done? As President Nyerere has warned,
"Killing people is not a sacrament". But it is an 
inescapable fact that only the dynamic counter violence 
of liberation will bring the static violence of 
repression to serious negotiations for surrender cf 
power when the power to be surrendered is vital to the 
repressor. Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, 
the Sahara Democratic Republic underline that.
International pressure is not a substitute. Until Africa 
has proved it can and will win by force if it cannot win 
by negotiation, there will not be effective international 
pressure - only sinister charades like the "Tarbaby" - 
"Sideshow II" strategy of Mr.. Secretary Kissinger; brutal 
sellouts like the Vorster-Duncan-Benn arrangements for 
Rossing uranium in Namibia; half serious, half maimed 
ventures like the "Gang of' Five" proximity talks on 
Namibia (and even those were possible only because the 
Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia was at last striking 
effectively and frequently).
■This is not to say political consciousness is not key - 
without it there will be no sustained guerilla wars.
Nor is it to advise lowering the pressure for international 
action and negotiation - quite the contrary. The goal is 
not Armageddon or war to the last wrecked house, burnt 
fieldand dead combattant - it is a negotiated transfer, 
as one had in Mozambique and Algeria. It is to warn 
that those who hold the triggers of power in Windhoek, 
Salisbury and Pretoria will not negotiate unloading them 
until they see the barrels of African guns much nearer 
and more precisely zeroed in on themselves than they do 
today.
VTI
African Development Coordination
"Small nations are like indecently clad women, they tempt
the evil minded" said President Nyerere some years ago.
"Consequently, African unity is not just a slogan, a
pious dream or an irresponsible ambition. It is a necessit11concluded the OAU/ECA Symposium.
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The questions are why has the past been marked by debacles?
How can African states move forward? The answers are
probably interlocked: the debacles have largely been in
respect to partially colonial inheritance schemes with
cniv slightly modified laissez falre cores operating in
a continent of independent states which - would be
capitalist and would be socialist alike - were committed12to national economic intervention.*" If that is the right 
reading/ then ECA's continued promotion of preferential 
and free trade areas and ECOWAS attempt to float what 
remains in the last analysis a complex, complete 
import model integration scheme"* ^ may be steps in the 
wrong direction.
Coordination must rest on durable common interests 
perceived by participants as accomplished better 
together than separately. These need not - one is tempted 
to say under African conditions usually do not - include 
generalized free trade. They may encompass coordinated 
production of specific goods which will lead to trade 
,e.g. Nigeria-Eenin/ or coordinated use of specifically 
identified otherwise idle productive capacity through 
trade,e.g. the Mozambicue-Tanzania agreement,but both of 
these approaches are very different from, and likely to 
be hampered by, accepting standard customs union theory.
Further the concerns may not center on trade at all - at
least not at first. The recent initiatives toward a
Southern African Development Coordination dynamic launchedi 4by the Front Line States are an example. vThe key goal 
is reduction of dependence on the Republic of South Africa. 
The first priority is delinking transport and communication 
by creating a regional network. A subsidiary goal is 
mobilizing finance to do it. Then came an array coordinating
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exercise of "permanent sovereignty" vis a vis mineral 
companies, food security arrangements, balanced trade 
agreements, coordination of production,no one of which 
is seen as necessarily having more urgency or priority 
than the others..
This is not an accidental incoherence of approach - it is 
a deliberate choice of unconventional wisccm. Chairman 
Quett Masire underlined this in his concluding remarks:-5
Until our economies are free from the domination 
of the Republic of South Africa and linked regionally 
with one another we cannot go forward with 
■assurance or in safety. We must ensure that the 
efforts of our people to achieve development, to 
meet their basic human needs are in a setting which 
gives them the greatest measure of success. That 
setting is Southern African regional development 
coordination. ... we have affirmed our determination 
to set out on the long journey
regional level ... we believe that we have taken 
that first step and have taken it in the right 
direction.
Clearly the key goals and routes in West Africa, Central 
Africa and the Mahgreb^ are not the same as in Southern 
Africa. The lack of any single overriding need like that 
confronting the FLS may, ironically, prove a disadvantage 
for establishing effective coordination. But mere 
serious reflection on what precise common interests were 
and how they could be met - even if this led to unconventional 
models more like the Andean Pact than CARICOM^ or SADC 
than EAC - would serve other regions and regional 
organisations better than slightly tarted up repetitions 
of past models.
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VIII
Paths Not Taken
A number of standard "problems" are noticeable by their 
absence from this short list. This is not necessarily 
because they are seen as unimportant but because they 
appear to be unsatisfactory ways either of posing or of
tackling the problem. Five-"old reliables" of this
18 20 19tyre are: ethnicity; production; neo-colonialism;
21efficiency ; socialism.
Ethnicity covers a multitude of evils - and goods. A 
border war, a clan skirmish, a national "objection" to 
marginalization in a multinational state, regional 
loyalties ... It is very often a manipulated - even if 
quite real - consciousness. Legitimacy and participation 
are better ways of posing the challenge - and especially 
of meeting it. So is Southern African Liberation if 
the "problem tribe" in mind is the Boers or the "savage 
clan" the Selous Scouts.
Production in the abstract begs too many questions.
Assuming food, income distribution and participation 
can be achieved,then production of the goods and services 
most needed is likely to follow. Resources will remain 
scarce but that is precisely the reason it is unhelpful 
to call for more production without specifying what? 
for whom? why? how? where?
Neo-colonialism - or its more advanced form, dependent develop 
ment - is very real. But to talk of tackling it 
requires pcsing questions about states, decision takers, 
participation, income distribution. Otherwise one at 
most chips away rough comers - Kenya is quite good at
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tough micro negotiation - or punches a feather pillow - 
the internal logic of the Zairean state precludes tough 
external economic negotiation. It does not deal with the 
context of change nor with who benefits.
Efficiency is a goal. But it is a dependent or ir.strner.ta 
goal — efficiency in the pursuit of some basic, substantive 
goal. It is not copying European management - pace 
McKinsey and Co. -nor European social demoncracy1s 
smooth running state corporate bureaucratism - pace 
Gunnar Myrdal and Jan Tinbergen. It cannot be discussed 
outside the objective correlative of a time and place 
and set of decision takers with time, resource and 
accomplishment constraints.
Capitalism in Africa is most unlikely to be African 
capitalism. Adjectival socialisms are usually variants 
of facism. There is little to suggest either President 
Nyerere or President Toure has judged wrong in these 
assertions. But that is not the same thing as arguing 
that the form of the challenge is planning socialist 
revolutions. In the first place,the six challenges 
cited would - do for that matter - confront African 
states in transition to socialism just as starkly (if 
perhaps somewhat more manageably) as they do those seeking 
a transition to domestic capitalism. In the second place/ 
if socialism is the first step to an answer,then facing 
food, income distribution and participation squarely 
will demonstrate the limits of dependent capitalist 
development and create the conditions to launch a coherent, 
mass based transition to socialism. Especially in much 
of West Africa those conditions simply do not exist today, 
and will not be created by intellectuals' affirmations.
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VIII
In Beginning
The purpose of projecting the future from the present 
and past is - or ought - to be to change it. A futurologist, 
therefore, should presumably end "in beginning" and not 
"in conclusion".
In fact, the prospects sketched are more uneven and 
uncertain than uniformly grim or foreboding. That dees 
suggest that President Nyerere’s dictum "To plan is to 
choose, choose to go forward" is relevant. 3as Congo 
famines, the lunar landscapes of Pekines, the consignment 
of majorities to the worlds of Petals of Blood, Amins 
and Nguemas, the lengthy survival of Smiths and Mudges, 
the grounded planes and closed borders of East African 
Non-Communities are not inevitable. The adverse external 
settings likely to confront Africa and most African 
states during the 1980’s do not invalidate that - challenges 
can bring forth responses, external penetration can give, 
rise to national resurgence.
As one concerned with the course of events in Africa one 
can only echo Gramsci’s letter from prison counselling 
"pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will".
As a futurologist one should perhaps conclude with the 
bemused comment of the first recorded practitioner - 
Pliny the Elder - when his predictions went wrong:
Out of Africa there is always something new.
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